If you enable --privileged just to get CAP_SYS_ADMIN for nested process isolation, you have added one layer (nested process visibility) while removing several others (seccomp, all capability restrictions, device isolation). The net effect is arguably weaker isolation than a standard unprivileged container. This is a real trade-off that shows up in production. The ideal solutions are either to grant only the specific capability needed instead of all of them, or to use a different isolation approach entirely that does not require host-level privileges.
"What [Squire's team] do day in and day out, and what they see, is a magnification of hundreds of times of what I've seen or had to deal with."
，更多细节参见51吃瓜
人 民 网 版 权 所 有 ，未 经 书 面 授 权 禁 止 使 用
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